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INTRODUCTION
Many Fortune 1000 companies have recently implemented various
forms of enhanced employee participation, often referred to as work
teams or quality circles, in an effort to remain competitive in today's
international economy.
During the past decade, a number of major American companies have
quietly launched and nurtured self-directed work teams, and have
reaped substantial rewards with little or no fanfare. Xerox, Procter &
Gamble, Tektronix, GM, Blue Cross of California, TRW, Shenandoah
Life, and many others have realized the enormous power of the fully
trained, fully committed team that is fully responsible for turning out a
final product or service.2
This recent trend raises some rather novel issues in claims of dis-
crimination under Title VII.3 For example, how is an African Ameri-
can team member supposed to prove that the team's promotion of a
white male to the position of supervisor was a violation of Title VII,
when the decision is inherently subjective and is ultimately formed by
fifteen different people? Team decision making complicates a pam-
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I The inspiration for this Comment was Susan Sturm's Race, Gender, and the Law in
the Twenty-First Century Workplace: Some Preliminary Observations, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 639 (1998).
JACK D. ORSBURN ET AL., SELF DIRECTED WORK TEAM: THE NEW AM RiCAN
CHALLENGE 5 (1990).
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1994). Title VII provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a) (1).
(931)
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digmatic Title VII analysis because the structure of decision making
differs dramatically from that which Congress envisioned when it en-
acted Title VII in 1964. The inherent problems associated with team
decision making are beginning to surface in Title VII litigation. For
example, three African American employees filed a Title VII claim in
the U.S. District Court in Milwaukee, claiming that S.C. Johnson
Wax's reliance on self-directed teams on the factory floor has limited
African American employees' opportunity for advancement! This suit
"appears to be the first race-bias complaint that involves work teams."'
This Comment will address the issues that arise in team-based de-
cision making and will propose a more tenable Title VII framework
for analyzing the S.C. Johnson claim and others like it. Part I will ex-
plain the impetus for the team structure and how teams generally
function within American companies. Part II will discuss how a Title
VII claim is analyzed under a typical hierarchical framework for both
"pretext" and "mixed motive" claims as well as "disparate impact"
claims. Part III will discuss the difficulty of bringing Title VII claims
against subjective employment decisions under present law, and the
added difficulty of applying such an analysis to team-based decisions.
Additionally, Part III will explain the tenets of cognitive bias theory
and will explore the dynamics of team decision making and the possi-
ble unconscious biases that can affect it. Part III will also address the
shortcomings of Title VII, which presently fails to account for cogni-
tive biases that can influence group behavior, even subconsciously.
Part IV will focus on the Title VII framework for multi-input employ-
ment decisions by examining two cases that are analogous to team-
based decisions. Part V will advocate changes in Title VII law to ac-
commodate this new organizational structure in American companies.
It will suggest: (1) eliminating the "Hicks" factor; (2) requiring an
employer to adopt procedural safeguards to minimize evaluator bias
in subjective evaluations; (3) imposing liability on employers when
one evaluator takes an unlawful consideration into account when
making an employment decision; and (4) allowing employees to
demonstrate that an employer's reliance on the team structure in
general is having a disparate impact on their employment opportuni-
ties. These changes are designed to help eliminate the present insula-
tion from Title VII liability seemingly enjoyed by employers relying on
4 See Timothy D. Schellhardt, Race-Bias Suit at S.C. Johnson Raises Some Worker-Team
Issues, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 1997, at B7 (describing the claim filed against S.C. John-
son's team structure).
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subjective, group employment decisions.
I. THE RISE OF TEAM STRUCTURES AND THEIR OPERATION
IN THE FORTUNE 1000
In order to remain competitive in the international economy,
many American companies have adopted new technologies and in-
6corporated greater flexibility in their respective production processes.
A common means of remaining competitive has been a decreased re-
liance on traditional organizational structures, accompanied by a cor-
responding increase in reliance on bottom-up decision making. Bot-
tom-up decision making occurs when workers are empowered with
real decision-making authority regarding their everyday production
tasks.7 Workers are still supervised by some form of management, and
the upper levels of management continue to control company policies
and goals. The form and title of the revised organizational structure
varies dramatically within companies, ranging from self-directed work
teams" to total quality management, but the central tenet remains the
same in most cases: give employees greater control over the produc-
tion process by eliminating formal structures of hierarchy, usually
through the elimination or restructuring of middle management.'0
6 See Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation:
From Bureaucratic to lexible Productiom, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 881-84 (1994) (describ-
ing the economic context of the emerging flexible work model).
See id. at 890-903 (explaining the potential benefits of self-managed teams and
their operation).
8 Orsburn describes self-directed work teams as follows:
A self-directed work team is a highly trained group of employees, from 6 to 18,
on average, fully responsible for turning out a well-defined segment of fin-
ished work. ... Because every member of the team shares equal responsibility
for this finished segment of work, self-directed teams represent the concep-
tual opposite of the assembly line, where each worker assumes responsibility
for a narrow technical function.
ORSBURN ETAL., supra note 2, at 8.
9 Total quality management refers to an organizational theory where an employee
is trained and involved in all phases of production of a particular product as opposed
to performing only one aspect of the production process repeatedly. See EILEEN
APPELBAUM & ROSEMARY BATr, HIGH-PERFORMANCE WORK SYSTEMS: AMERICAN
MODELS OF WORKPLACE TRANSFORMATION 12-17 (1993) (discussing the elements of
the total quality management theory that are present in American corporations).
10 See CLAY CARR, TEAMPOwERz LESSONS FROM AMERICA'S TOP COMPANIES ON
PUTTING TEAMPOWER TO WORK 73-90 (1992) (describing several examples of compa-
nies that have successfully implemented team systems); ORSBURN ET AL, supra note 2,
at 10 ("[E]ach member of a self-directed work team performs many activities, and
managers leave the team alone, so long as the team's product or service meets or ex-
ceeds established expectations.").
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This shift in organizational structure is designed to enable the com-
pany to produce its product at a lower cost than its competitors.
Workplace decisions are usually based on the team's consensus,
and a given team may control the production process, hiring, promo-
tions, discipline, evaluations, and layoffs." To ensure that team mem-
bers are capable of handling these various tasks, employees receive
training to improve their technical, interpersonal, and administrative
skills. 2 Employees operating in enhanced participatory regimes gen-
erally have more motivation on the job, lower levels of absenteeism,
and greater loyalty to their employer, all of which enhance their pro-
ductivity.3 In addition, such a system promotes flexibility, encourages
the acceptance of new technologies, and leads to innovations in the
modes of production that can improve efficiency.
4
The shift towards decentralization in the production process has
not been limited to traditionally blue-collar jobs. Autonomous work
teams have also been effectively used for some white-collar positions.'5
A 1990 study found that 47% of the Fortune 1000 are using some
form of self-managing work teams, an increase from 28% in 1987.16
While many of the companies that have adopted the concept of en-
hanced employee participation have yet to incorporate their model
throughout the company, 7 the increasing number of Fortune 1000
companies experimenting with such forms of production is an em-
n See Barenberg, supra note 6, at 891 ("In its fullest forms, the self-managing team
takes on personnel selection, discipline, and compensation, as well as budgeting, pur-
chasing, and customer-relations tasks.").
12 See ORsBuRN ET AL., supra note 2, at 18 (explaining the three critical areas-
technical, administrative, and interpersonal-crucial to the transition to full self-
direction).
is See, e.g., Barenberg, supra note 6, at 894 (noting how participatory workplaces
tend to enhance worker motivation).
14 See EDWARD E. LAWLER III ET AL., EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT AND TOTAL QUAIT
MANAGEMENT: PRACrICES AND REsuLTs iN FORTUNE 1000 COMPANiES 105-12 (1992)
(assessing the impact of total quality management programs); see also DALE E. YEATTS &
CLOYD HYrEN, HIGH-PERFORMING SELF-MANAGED WORK TEAMs: A COMPARISON OF
THEORY TO PRAcTIcE 77-102 (1998) (discussing the positive impact that communica-
tion, cooperation, and trust within self-managed work teams can have on a firm's over-
all competitiveness).
15 See ORSBURN ET AL., supra note 2, at 172 (noting that "[t]hree types of white-
collar self-directed work teams have in fact delivered positive benefits: (1) white-collar
production teams, (2) white-collar professional teams, and (3) white-collar workers on
blue-collar production teams").
16 See LAWLER ET AL., supra note 14, at 28 (noting the degree to which firms have
employed self-directed work teams).
See id.; Barenberg, supra note 6, at 890 (noting that only ten percent of Fortune
1000 companies utilizing self-managed work teams "applied them to more than twenty
percent of their workforce").
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pirical indication that those that have implemented such a system
have been successful in their endeavors.
Generally, an individual's performance in a self-directed work
team is evaluated based on the productivity of her team.' Such an
evaluation system encourages team members to align their personal
goals with that of the team.19 Professor Lawler's 1990 study found that
61% of the companies that have based their reward system on team
incentives found them to be successful or very successful, while only
5% found such incentives to be unsuccessful. 0 Even within the team
context, however, some form of individual review exists. The most
popular form of individual review is peer appraisals:
Team members are in the best position to judge other individuals on the
team because of their more frequent interactions in the work area and
in team meetings.... Peer appraisals also help to empower teams be-
cause they are another management responsibility the team can assume
with the aid of some guidelines and a good appraisal system.2
It is quite possible to imagine the potential shortcomings of a
peer-review system, however, particularly if the organization's evalua-
tion process is not designed to catch biases and prejudices among the
team members. Prejudice within the group can have a devastating ef-
fect on the appraisal a particular employee receives from her peers,
which in turn may negatively affect her compensation level.t2 The
novel aspect of the discriminatory team decision, as compared to that
of a traditional prejudiced supervisor, is the difficulty in proving an
allegation of discrimination due to the number of subjective evalua-
tions that are considered in reaching the decision being challenged.
An aggrieved employee in a traditional workplace, on the other hand,
can more readily identify the source of potential animus when making
a Title VII claim.
18 See YEA=rs & HYrEN, supra note 14, at 91 (describing reward systems that are
based on team performance); Barenberg, supra note 6, at 892 (noting that quality in
team structures is "reinforced by the combination of group-based and individual merit
pay incentives implemented widely in team plants").
19 It is generally agreed that if a reward system for an organization is based on team
performance, "then team members will be motivated to cooperate," but when "rewards
are based on individual performance, conflict is more likely to occur as team members
struggle to make themselves look good, regardless of the effects of the team's overall
performance." YEATrS & HYrEN, supra note 14, at 91.
20 See LAWLER ET AL., supra note 14, at 55.
21 YEATrS & HYrrN, supra note 14, at 128-29.
See id. at 130 (noting that "the relationship between peer appraisals and mone-
tary compensation lingers as a point of controversy").
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Autonomous work teams are premised on the notion that every
member of the team participates in decision making. These teams,
too, have the potential for various forms of discrimination to infect
the decision-making process. For example, team members may elect
their supervisor from within the group.23 In addition, teams often as-
sign members to various roles in the production process and may as-
sign minority, older, or female employees to less desirable tasks if the
team feels they are not a good "fit" with the more desirable functions
in the production process. The majority of the team may even view
an employee protected by Title VII as inferior and therefore discount
that employee's suggestions, undermining the tenet of the team proc-
ess. Such forms of prejudice can inhibit the performance of the team
and the victimized employee, both of whom become disenchanted
with the team process.25
Title VII was enacted when American workplace relations could
be classified as a bureaucratic hierarchy, where shop-floor employees
were supervised by floor supervisors, who in turn were supervised by
middle managers and so on. It is much easier to point to an invidious
decision maker under the traditional paradigm of workplace relations
since the contours of a supervisory relationship are better defined.
With the shift toward more participatory workplace models and the
blurring of formal hierarchies, a new question arises: How does a Ti-
tle VII claim function in a multi-input decision-making context in
light of the fact that the Title VII framework was formulated to target
either one particular decision maker's bias or a company's discrimina-
tory practices as a whole? 6 Tangible proof of discrimination may very
well be unavailable to a member of an autonomous work team, par-
ticularly when, for example, the employee has consistently been
passed over for promotions based on the subjective evaluations of her
peers. Does the subjective nature of such decisions and the multiple
inputs into that decision insulate it from an effective Title VII analy-
23 SeeYEATIs & HYrEN, supra note 14, at 303 (discussing how in some cases teams
have the authority to "elect their own leader with no input from management").
24 See Barenberg, supra note 6, at 891 (noting that self-managed teams usually con-
trol "work-flow design, set-up, [and] task assignment").
2 SeeYEATrs & HYrEN, supra note 14, at 231-32 (discussing the negative effects of
prejudice on team performance by lowering the quality of interpersonal interactions,
and the negative impact of prejudice on the recipients of prejudice).
26 See Sturm, supra note 1, at 643 ("Individuals constitute the unit of analysis, to the
exclusion of groups and structures that often play more central roles in causing indi-
vidual exclusion based on race and gender.").
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sis?" Proponents of the autonomous work team model suggest creat-
ing some form of grievance procedure for team members who feel
that they have been treated unfairly.2s Such a system, however, is not
required by law. The issues that arise when an aggrieved employee
takes legal action against her company on the basis that the terms or
conditions of her employment have been hindered by the team's bias
against that employee's race, gender, or national origin in violation of
Title VII are intriguing and will be addressed later in this Comment.
II. THE TITLE VII FRAMEWORK
Title VII renders it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin."2 In pursuing a Title VII
claim, a plaintiff can allege that her employer's discriminatory animus
resulted in "disparate treatment" or that the employer's hiring and
promotion practices have had a "disparate impact" on the opportuni-
ties afforded to a particular protected group. To prove disparate
treatment, the plaintiff must demonstrate through either direct or in-
direct evidence that her employer considered the plaintiff's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin in making the employment de-
cision, and that such consideration negatively impacted the terms and
conditions of her employment.30 The disparate impact model is used
to analyze claims of discrimination involving employment practices
that are "facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but
27 See Schellhardt, supra note 4, at B7 (pointing out that the Johnson-Wax suit "ap-
pears to be the first race-bias complaint that involves work teams"). An alternative the-
ory might be that there are fewer reports of discrimination in the team context be-
cause employees are generally happier under this organizational structure and do not
feel the effects of group bias. That theory, however, is undermined by recent studies
that have confirmed the continued prevalence of discrimination against Hispanics and
African Americans. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Rela-
tionsAfterAffirmativeAction, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1303 (1998) (discussing three recent
studies that confirm the existence of discrimination in the labor market).
-8 See, e.g., ORsBURN ETAL, supra note 2, at 297 (advocating the establishment of a
"Peer Disciplinary Review committee" that "broadens the application of the work-team
concept within an organization").
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1994).
so SeeWatson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988) (noting that in
claims of disparate treatment, "the plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant had
a discriminatory intent or motive").
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that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot
be justified by business necessity.""
A. Disparate Treatment Theory
Disparate treatment claims are based on the premise that the em-
ployer invidiously discriminated against the victimized plaintiff. "Un-
der existing law, the disparate treatment plaintiff... must prove not
only that she was treated differently, but that such treatment was
caused by purposeful or intentional discrimination. "
32
A Title VII claim of disparate treatment falls into one of two cate-
gories: "pretext" cases and "mixed motive" cases. In a "pretext" case,
the plaintiff ultimately attempts to prove that the employer's prof-
fered reason for the plaintiff's adverse employment situation was a
pretext for discrimination.3 To do so, the plaintiff must first establish
a prima facie case of discrimination. If she establishes this claim, the
burden of production then shifts to the employer.3 4 A litigant with the
burden of proof must convince the trier of fact of the validity of her
position before a claim proceeds to the next stage.3 5 The burden of
production, in contrast, is a much less onerous burden, simply requir-
ing the litigant to offer to the trier of fact a legitimate reason for the
employment decision in question.3 To establish a prima facie case of
31 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15
(1977).
32 Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1168 (1995);
see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989) ("The critical inquiry,
the one commanded by the words of§ 703(a) (1), is whether gender was a factor in the
employment decision at the moment it was made."), superseded by Civil Rights Act of 1991 §
107, Pub. L. No. 102-166 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994)) (interpreting the
statutory language of Title VII in determining the appropriate legal analysis in mixed
motive cases); Sturm, supra note 1, at 642 (discussing the inadequacy of present em-
ployment law because its "analysis based solely on motivation ignores the role of cogni-
tion in shaping and producing bias").
33 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973) (laying out the
plaintiff's burden of proving pretext in claims of disparate treatment).
See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 245-46 (stating that the plaintiff must first
establish a prima facie case to shift the burden of production to the employer).
35 See BLAcK'S LAW DIarONARY 190 (7th ed. 1999) (defining the burden of proof
as "[a] party's duty to prove a disputed assertion or charge "). Thus, evidence suffi-
cient to satisfy the burden of proof must successfully convince the factfinder of the
facts sought to be established, and those facts must constitute all of the essential ele-
ments of the claim or defense.
See id. (defining the burden of producing evidence as "a party's duty to intro-
duce enough evidence on an issue to have the issue decided by the fact-finder rather
than decided against the party in a peremptory ruling"); see also Woodson v. Scott Pa-
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discrimination under Tide VII, as was established in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, a plaintiff must show. (i) that she belongs to a pro-
tected class; (ii) that she applied and was qualified for ajob opening
or promotion for which the employer sought applications; (iii) that
despite her qualifications she was rejected; and (iv) that after her re-
jection, the job remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications. 7 To avoid
placing too heavy a burden on the plaintiff in Tire VII cases involving
a dispute over "subjective" qualifications, courts have required the
plaintiff to demonstrate only that she was minimally qualified for a
particular job until the later stages of the McDonnell test.3 The pur-
pose of the prima facie test is to eliminate the most common, non-
discriminatory reasons behind a challenged employment decision,
such as the unavailability of ajob opening.
Once the plaintiff satisfies her burden of proof, a presumption of
discrimination exists, and the burden of production shifts to the em-
ployer to introduce evidence of "some legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for the employee's rejection."39 The employer's introduction
of evidence of a non-discriminatory reason for its adverse action effec-
tively rebuts the plaintiff's prima facie case.4 Thus, once the em-
ployer satisfies its burden of production, the burden of proof shifts
back to the plaintiff to convince the factfinder, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the presumptively valid reason for her rejection was
in fact a pretext for a discriminatory decision.4 ' Even if the trier of
per Co., 109 F.3d 913, 920 n.2 (3d Cir. 1997) ("The defendant's burden at this stage is
relatively light: it is satisfied if the defendant articulates any legitimate reason for the
discharge; the defendant need not prove that the articulated reason actually motivated
the discharge.").
57 See 411 U.S. at 802 (laying out the elements required for a prima facie case of
racial discrimination).
ss See Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 523 (3d Cir. 1992)
("In Title VT! cases involving a dispute over 'subjective' qualifications, we have recog-
nized that the qualification issue should often be resolved in the second and third
stages of the McDonnellDouglas/Burdine analysis, to avoid putting too onerous a burden
on the plaintiff .... "); see also 45A AM. JUR. 2D,Job Discrimination § 418 ("While posses-
sion of objective job qualifications are an element of a plaintiff's prima facie case, the
court said that evidence regarding subjective criteria should be left for the 'later stages'
of the inquiry." (citing Burrus v. United Tel. Co., 683 F.2d 339, 342 (10th Cir. 1982))).
39 McDonnell.Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
40 SeeSt. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993) (noting that once an
employer has met its burden of production, it has "rebutted any legal presumption of
intentional discrimination").
41 See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804 (remanding in order to provide the
plaintiff an opportunity "to show that petitioner's stated reason for respondent's rejec-
tion was in fact pretext").
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fact finds that the employer's proffered, non-discriminatory rationale
was not in fact the true reason for the employment action taken, the
judge may not hold the employer liable for unlawfully discriminating
against the plaintiff unless the trier of fact also affirmatively finds that
the employer's action was the product of unlawful discrimination.4 2 As
stated by the Supreme Court, "nothing in law would permit us to sub-
stitute for the required finding that the employer's action was the
product of unlawful discrimination, the much different (and much
lesser) finding that the employer's explanation of its action was not
believable."4 The holding in St Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks dramati-
cally undermines the presumption of discrimination established
through the prima facie test. It puts plaintiffs in pretext cases in the
difficult position of having to rebut not only the employer's proffered
reason for the adverse employment action, but also any other reason
that the trier of fact might conceive the employer considered in taking
such adverse employment action.
The legal framework for a challenged employment decision that
involves a combination of both legitimate and unlawful factors, such
as race, gender, or national origin (hence, a "mixed motive" case), was
established in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.4 4 In a mixed motive case, the
plaintiff retains the burden of persuading the finder of fact that an
unlawful consideration played a part in the employment decision.45
Once the plaintiff shows that discrimination was a "motivating fac-
tor,"46 the defendant may have a partial affirmative defense if it can
42 See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 514-15 (allowing an employer to escape liability under Title
VII despite the fact that the court did not believe the employer's proffered rationale
for its decision).
43 Id.
490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (holding that when a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves
that her gender played a part in an adverse employment decision, the employer may
avoid a finding of liability only by proving that it would have made the same decision
without taking gender into account).
See id. at 246 ("[W]e hold that the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion on
the issue whether gender played a part in the employment decision."); see also Wood-
son v. Scott Paper Co., 898 F. Supp. 298, 307 (E.D. Pa. 1995) ("Plaintiff at all times has
the burden of showing by a preponderance that defendant was motivated by a dis-
criminatory purpose.").
46 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (m) (overturning an aspect of the Price Waterhouse decision by
requiring that discrimination only be a motivating factor rather than the determinative
factor). The Court in Price Waterhouse defined "motivating factor" as follows:
In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, we
mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of the decision what its
reasons were and if we received a truthful response, one of those reasons
would be that the applicant or employee was a woman.
490 U.S. at 250.
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prove that it would have made the same decision even if it had not
taken the employee's race, gender, or national origin into account in
making its decision.47 Generally, plaintiffs will not know which theory
they are going to submit for the jury's consideration until after discov-
ery, and sometimes as late as closing arguments. As a result, courts
permit plaintiffs to argue under both theories.
B. Disparate Impact Theory
A plaintiff may also succeed in bringing a claim against an em-
ployer under Tite VII by showing that the employer's practices, such
as its hiring criteria, have had a disparate impact on members of the
plaintiff's protected class.4 In such a case, the plaintiff does not need
to prove discriminatory intent.? The plaintiff, however, must identify
the specific employment practice or practices that are allegedly caus-
ing the disparate impact!' In order to establish a prima facie case of
disparate impact, the plaintiff must: (1) identify a specific employ-
ment practice; (2) identify a statistically significant imbalance in the
workforce adverse to the protected class; and (3) show that the spe-
47 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994) (establishing that an unlawful employment
practice is the consideration of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, as a moti-
vating factor in making employment decisions); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45
(noting that if an employer would have reached the same employment decision de-
spite the consideration of unlawful factors in making its decision, it could avoid liabil-
ity).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (2) (allowing plaintiffs to plead in the alternative); Price
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247 n.12 (recognizing that plaintiffs will bring claims of dis-
crimination under both the pretext model as well as the mixed motive model).
49 See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988) (noting that
the "premise of the disparate impact approach is that some employment practices,
adopted without a deliberately discriminatory motive, may in operation be functionally
equivalent to intentional discrimination").
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-47 (1976) (stating that when an em-
ployer's hiring practices disqualify a disproportionate number of African Americans, a
discriminatory purpose need not be proved); see also Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440,
446 (1982) (same).
51 In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, the Court stated that "in cases where an em-
ployer combines subjective criteria with the use of more rigid standardized rules or
tests, the plaintiff is in our view responsible for isolating and identifying the specific
employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical dispari-
ties." 490 U.S. 642, 656 (1989) (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S.
977, 994 (1988)). This is particularly important in the present inquiry because it seems
that, based on present law, a plaintiff challenging the failure of a self-directed work
team to promote a minority to the position of supervisor would need to identify the
specific aspects of the process which caused the alleged statistical disparity between the
number of minorities qualified for the position and the number of minorities pres-
ently employed as supervisors.
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cific employment practice is responsible for the statistical disparities. 2
Significant statistical disparities only based on generalized population
data are insufficient to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact;
the proper inquiry is a comparison between the composition of the
"qualified persons in the [relevant] labor market and the persons
holding at-issue jobs."53 For example, in Washington v. Davis, a group
of unsuccessful African-American male applicants challenged the Dis-
trict of Columbia's reliance on a written personnel test to determine
whether applicants possessed a particular level of verbal skill necessary
for the job of police officer, arguing that the test had a racially dis-
proportionate impact.5 Once a plaintiff has met her burden, she will
have established a prima facie case of disparate impact and the bur-
den of proof will shift to the employer to demonstrate that the chal-
lenged practice is 'Job related for the position in question and consis-
tent with business necessity.
'55
The plaintiff may prevail in spite of an employer's ability to dem-
onstrate that a practice is job related and consistent with business ne-
cessity if the plaintiff can persuade the factfinder that: (i) an "alterna-
tive employment practice" will achieve the employer's legitimate
interests without having a disproportionately negative impact on
members of the protected classes in question, and (ii) the "respon-
dent refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice.5 5 If the
plaintiff can show that the employer can obtain a comparable result
using a different practice and that the employer refuses to adopt such
practice, the plaintiff will have proven that the employer's rationale is.... 57
a pretext for discrimination. According to the Second Circuit,
52 See Watson, 487 U.S. at 994-95 (setting forth the test for claims of disparate im-
pact).
53 Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 650; see also Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. City of Bridge-
port, 933 F.2d 1140, 1146 (2d Cir. 1991) ("This showing [of a prima facie case] may be
made through statistical evidence revealing a disparity so great that it cannot reasona-
bly be attributed to chance.").
54 426 U.S. 229, 232-33 (1976). The claim was eventually dismissed by the Court,
which held that the challenged test directly related to the requirements of the police
training program and was thus job related. See id. at 250 ("[S]ome minimum verbal
and communicative skill would be very useful, if not essential, to satisfactory progress
in the training regime.").
55 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) (i) (1994).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) (ii) (1999).
57 See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 660-61 (establishing the procedure for a plaintiff to
recover even when an employer proves the employment practice in question is a busi-
ness necessity). This is not as viable an avenue for the plaintiff as it may first appear
because the suggested alternative must be "equally effective" as the employer's practice,
taking into account considerations such as cost and burden on the employer. See id. at
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"[s] uch proof would rebut a showing that the test was job related be-
cause a refusal to adopt such alternatives 'would belie a claim by [the
employer] that [its] incumbent practices are being employed for non-
discriminatory reasons. '
III. THE DFFCULTY OF APPLYING TRADITIONAL TIrLE VII LAW TO
SuBJEcTIVE GROUP DECISION MAKING
The Supreme Court has stated that the appropriate inquiry in a
Title VII claim is whether or not an unlawful consideration "was a fac-
tor in the employment decision at the moment it was made."5 9 Self-
directed work teams, as discussed earliere make many subjective deci-
sions during the course of their everyday operations. Since every team
member's input is taken into consideration, it is substantially more
difficult to label a particular decision as discriminatory in nature be-
cause of the sheer number of decision makers involved in the ultimate
course of action. The use of subjective criteria is generally more sus-
ceptible to a Title VII challenge when there are inadequate safeguards
61to control any bias by the evaluator. Such safeguards can include
specific guidelines for evaluating employees with a review by higher
management and the personnel division, written criteria that are re-
viewed with employees, an appeals process, and ratings reviewed by
other supervisors.62
How may a minority worker who believes that his team has con-
tinuously passed him up for promotion based on his color prove such
an allegation?6 This Part will address this issue by illustrating the dif-
661 (emphasis added).
53 Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 933 F.2d 1140, 1147 (2d Cir.
1991) (quoting Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 661).
59 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989), superseded by Civil Rights
Act of 1991 § 107, Pub. L. No. 102-166 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 (m)).
60 See supra note 11 and accompanying text (describing the method and scope of
work team decision making).
61 See 45A AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 38, § 419 (discussing employer susceptibility
when relying on subjective criteria without implementing safeguards).
62 See Thompson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 416 F. Supp. 972, 982 (E.D. Mo.
1976) (upholding a rating system in which subjective criteria are evaluated in writing,
discussed with the employee, and reviewed by multiple supervisors); 45A AM. JuR. 2D,
supra note 38, § 419 (laying out possible safeguards to minimize bias in subjective
evaluations (citing Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co., 499 F. Supp. 427 (S.D. Tex. 1980)).
Unfortunately, controlling the potential bias of an entire team is considerably more
difficult than controlling the bias of an individual evaluator and will be re-addressed in
Part ll.A.
63 Due to the autonomy of many self-directed work teams, the potential for preju-
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ficulty in applying traditional Title VII analysis to group decision mak-
ing. It will also discuss the enhanced difficulty of such an analysis
when taking into account the potential for cognitive bias on the part
of those making substantially subjective decisions. Many complexities
surface when one applies present-day Title VII law to the team-based
context prevalent in many successful corporations today.64
A. Issues Raised in Performing a Disparate Treatment Analysis
1. Complications of Subjective, Team-Based Decisions
Despite the Court's postponement of deciding whether a particu-
lar plaintiff is in fact "qualified" in subjective employment decisions
until the last stage of the "pretext" analysis, 6 several potential prob-
lems are apparent in the adjudication of a team member's disparate
treatment claim.
Problem 1:
Assuming that the Court applies the prima facie threshold loosely
in the group decision-making context, an employer may nonetheless
respond quite easily with a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
its decision.6 For a subjective promotion system, an employer can ar-
gue that the "subjectivity is job-related, that is, that something about
the position requires the selector to use subjective evaluations of the
dice pervading the team's decision-making process is not limited to hindering a pro-
tected employee's opportunity for promotion. As mentioned above in supra notes 7-14
and accompanying text, autonomous teams control many aspects of their everyday
functioning. A team that is prejudiced against a particular employee may not only fal
to promote that employee to a position of authority but also may relegate that em-
ployee to more menial functions within the production process or discount that em-
ployee's suggestions, upsetting one of the essential tenets of the team-based decision-
making process. The team may also directly affect that employee's compensation level
by issuing poor evaluations and rendering harsher disciplinary sanctions upon him.
Additionally, the team may simply fail to hire an individual on the basis of unlawful
considerations. "Absent corrective measures, systematic biases... can be expected to
disadvantage members of stereotyped groups or individuals who are socially 'distant'
from the decisionmaker or who, for whatever reason, the decisionmaker has grouped
in a different cognitive category." Krieger, supra note 32, at 1207.
64 This is by no means an exhaustive discussion of the complexities of such an
analysis, but merely an attempt to flesh out several of the difficulties in making such an
analsis.
See supra note 38 and accompanying text (noting that in certain instances, courts
will not require a plaintiff to prove that she was more than minimally qualified for a
position until the later stages of the analysis).
66 See 45A AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 38, § 418 (noting that an employer must demon-
strate that the challenged subjective evaluations are necessary to the job).
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applicant's unquantifiable attributes."67 In particular, the employer
can point to the autonomy of the work team and claim that it was ul-
timately the team's decision. 63 This is particularly difficult because the
team may have taken eighteen different opinions into account in
reaching its ultimate conclusion. Team-based decisions are thus dis-
tinguishable from those made by an employer basing its decision on
an employee's immediate supervisor. It is much more difficult to
point a finger at an individual in the former case than in the latter
case, where one individual is directly responsible for the adverse deci-
sion in question.
Problem 2.
How may a plaintiff rebut the team's reasoning under the "pre-
text" theory when each team member may offer a different reason for
the ultimate decision? It seems unfair, if not impractical, to require
that a plaintiff prove that every rationale offered was pre-textual. A
Title VII analysis, in its present form, however, might require just such
a result since every team member in a sense acted as a decision maker
and Title VII requires the examination of the motives of an individual
decision maker.69 The threshold placed on the aggrieved team mem-
ber is raised even higher when one includes the Hicks factor70 into the
formula. Is a plaintiff supposed to attempt to persuade the factfinder
that the team members' proffered justifications for their decision were
pretext for discrimination, and, at the same time, attempt to under-
mine any other possible reason not offered that a factfinder might
find compelling as well?
Problem 3:
Even if the plaintiff can prove that a team member or several team
members were prejudiced against her particular demographic group,
how many team members must have taken the plaintiff's race, gender,
sex, or national origin into account for a court to find that the team's
67 Id
See supra notes 11, 23-24 and accompanying text (discussing the breadth of per-
mitted team decisions and the ability of some self-directed work teams to elect their
own supervisors without input from management).
69 See Krieger, supra note 32, at 1167 ("[T]here is no discrimination without an in-
vidiously motivated actor."); Sturm, supra note 1, at 642-43 (noting that the laws focus
on individuals "to the exclusion of groups and structures").
70 See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 514-15 (1998) (noting that the
plaintiff must still prove the employer unlawfully discriminated even if his proffered
reason is determined to be pretextual); see also supra notes 42-43 and accompanying
text (discussing how a trier of fact may reject the employer's proffered rationale for its
employment decision and nonetheless find that a legitimate, non-discriminatory rea-
son for its action did in fact exist).
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proffered, non-discriminatory reason was pretextual? The factfinder
at trial must decide whether discrimination was a motivating factor in
the decision in question,7' or whether the same result would have
been reached but for discrimination. Applying that standard, how-
ever, is not as simple as it might appear. To what extent must bias
pervade the team? Is it sufficient for a minority of team members to
demonstrate bias? Should a plaintiff be required to show that the
team's ultimate decision would have been different in order to prove
that such ajustification is pretext? In the alternative, is evidence that
the decision was tainted with prejudice sufficient to make such a find-
ing?
The Third Circuit has held that if an employer makes a decision
based on the recommendation of a supervisor in a traditional hierar-
chical organization, and if that supervisor took unlawful considera-
tions into account in reaching its decision, that evidence is sufficient
to taint the ultimate employment decision as a violation of Title VII.
Yet, theoretically, courts could apply a different standard for team-
based decisions based on the majority-vote system, since one recom-
mendation will not directly determine an employer's decision in the
same way as it would in a hierarchical system. A biased recommenda-
tion from an influential team member, however, may have as signifi-
cant an effect as a biased recommendation from a supervisor in a typi-
cal organizational structure.73 Thus, courts analyzing this situation
should conclude that one unchecked, biased team member is suffi-
cient to shift the burden of proof to the employer.
2. Cognitive Bias Theory
Courts look to the decision maker's state of mind when he took
the challenged employment action.7 4 Title VII has generally been
71 See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (laying out the legal standard in
mixed motive claims).
See, e.g., Olson v. General Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 954-55 (3d Cir. 1996)
(averring that a reasonable factfinder could impute to GE knowledge of Olson's al-
leged disability on the basis of demonstrated knowledge by an employee who was part
of the hiring process).
73 See infra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing the potential impact of in-
fluential team members).
74 See Krieger, supra note 32, at 1166-67 (discussing Title VII's shortcoming in fo-
cusing on the decision maker's state of mind); Sturm, supra note 1, at 641 ("[Platterns
of exclusion, job segregation, and bias frequently emerge from more subtle, interac-
tive, and structural dynamics that often are not visible within the individualistic,'fault-
driven categories embodied in current legal structures."); see, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Cir.,
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criticized for its focus on blatant discrimination and its failure to ad-
dress more subtle forms of bias.75
This failure... stems from the assumption that disparate treatment dis-
crimination, whether conscious or unconscious, is primarily motiva-
tional, rather than cognitive, in origin. This one sided understanding of
bias leads courts to approach every disparate treatment case as a search
for discriminatory motive or intent. To the extent that intergroup bias
stems from other sources, current models may either fail to identify dis-
crimination or wrongfully attribute discriminatory motive to a well-
intentioned, though biased, decision-maker.
7 6
It is now fairly well established in social psychology that prejudice
can pervade an individual's thoughts and actions subconsciously
7 7
This theory is based on the human brain's instinctive categorization of
everything to aid in processing information: the "central premise of
social cognition theory [is] that cognitive structures and processes in-
volved in categorization and information processing can in and of
themselves result in stereotyping and other forms of biased intergroup
judgment previously attributed to motivational processes."7 8 As a re-
sult, humans unintentionally separate people by their race, gender,
509 U.S. at 516-17 ("[The plaintiff has] the ultimate burden of persuading the court
that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination."); Smithers v. Bailar, 629
F.2d 892, 898 (3d Cir. 1980) (requiring plaintiff to prove that disparate treatment was
caused by "purposeful or intentional discrimination").
75 See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 32, at 1164 ("Title VII jurisprudence... is inade-
quate to address the subtle, often unconscious forms of bias that Title VII was also in-
tended to remedy."); Charles R. Lawrence I, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reck-
oning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 321-23 (1987) (criticizing the
doctrine of discriminatory purpose by focusing on the influence of unconscious racial
motivation); Sturm, supra note 1, at 641-42 (pointing to recent increases in the knowl-
edge of complex and subtle dynamics of discrimination through research in the fields
of social psychology and organizational behavior).
76 Krieger, supra note 32, at 1164-65.
77 See id. at 1187-90 (hypothesizing that stereotyping is a standard cognitive func-
tion that categorizes information in a way that inherently biases perception); Krieger,
supra note 27, at 1284 (stating that stereotype activation is unintentional); Lawrence,
supra note 75, at 322 ("[A] large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimina-
tion is influenced by unconscious racial motivation."); Sturm, supra note 1, at 642
("[A]nalysis based solely on motivation ignores the role of cognition in shaping and
producing bias."). For a more thorough explanation of the origins of social cognition
theory, see David L. Hamilton & Tina K. Trolier, Stereotypes and Stereotyping: An Over-
view of the CognitiveApproach, inPREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACIsM 1, 127, 133-37
(John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986).
78 Krieger, supra note 32, at 1187. For a discussion on the cognitivists' theory of
categorization, see also Lawrence, supra note 75, at 337. "All humans tend to catego-
rize in order to make sense of experience. Too many events occur daily for us to deal
successfully with each one on an individual basis; we must categorize in order to cope."
Id.
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and age.79 This lack of intent severely undermines present Title VII
law, which erroneously focuses on the state of mind of the decision
maker at the time the employment decision is made,s when in fact,
many theorists would argue that cognitive bias distorts the decision
maker's ability to form an unbiased decision well before the decision
is ever made. Whether it is appropriate or practical for Title VII to
attempt to prevent such cognitive biases is beyond the scope of this
inquiry. It is, however, an additional factor to consider when advocat-
ing for the reform of Title VII law to accommodate companies' in-
creased reliance on group decision making.
Assuming that this theory is accurate-that often, there is no sin-
gle, identifiable moment of intentional discrimination-the potential
for discriminatory employment decisions, particularly in the team-
based context, is overwhelming and exists virtually without recourse
due to the sheer number of decision makers involved in the ultimate
decision.82 Focusing on an employer's state of mind at the moment
the employment decision is made fails to address unintentional biases
that, according to social cognition theorists, frequently influence a
decision. The potential for cognitive biases affecting an employment
decision is amplified in the team-based context because it allows for
additional, potentially distorted, perceptions and judgments to factor
into the ultimate decision.
3. The Potential Impact of Cognitive Bias on
Subjective Group Decision Making
Proving that a team discriminated against one of its members in
failing to promote that member, or in giving her poor assignments or
reviews, is dramatically complicated when one factors in cognitive bi-
79 See Lawrence, supra note 75, at 330 ("[Racism] is a part of our common histori-
cal experience and, therefore, a part of our culture. It arises from the assumptions we
have learned to make about the world, ourselves, and others as well as from the pat-
terns of our fundamental social activities.").
8o See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240-41 (1989) ("The present, ac-
tive tense ... turns our attention to the actual moment of the... adverse employment
decision."), superseded by Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 107, Pub. L. No. 102-166 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994).
81 See, e.g., Krieger, supra note 32, at 1211 (discussing cognitive bias and the bifur-
cation of perception and judgment); Lawrence, supra note 75, at 337-38 (noting the
early and vulnerable age at which one learns about race).
"The dynamics of conflict among diverse groups . .. cannot be understood solely
through an individualistic framework of analysis." Sturm, supra note 1, at 641-42.
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ases.8s Not only does the potential for cognitive bias undermine the
entire foundation upon which present Title VII analysis is founded,
but it significantly complicates the process by which an individual
must prove that an employer took into account the plaintiffs race,
gender, sex, or national origin in reaching his determination. After
all, how may a plaintiff demonstrate bias in the employer's thought
process effectively when the employer honestly believes that bias does
not exists
Thus, an individual may select a white job applicant over an
equally qualified black applicant and honestly believe that this deci-
sion was based on observed intangibles unrelated to race. The em-
ployer perceives the white candidate as "more articulate," "more col-
legial," "more thoughtful," or "more charismatic." He is unaware of
the learned stereotype that influenced his decision.8
The potential for cognitive biases to infect an individual's capacity
to make a rational decision is further complicated when one considers
its potentially damaging effect on group decisions. All of the issues
raised in the preceding paragraphs should be reexamined for con-
scious as well as unconscious prejudice in each individual's decision-
making process, and then reanalyzed in light of the effect on the
team's ultimate decision."" Such a process may not be completely real-
istic as a functional rule which courts can apply with any consistency,
The court in Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235, was presented evidence that the
plaintiff's pursuit of firm partnership was negatively affected by partners' cognitive bi-
ases toward women. "Thomas Beyer [the man who explained to Hopkins that the
Board decided to place her candidacy for partnership on hold] advised, Hopkins
should 'walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear
make-up, have her hair styled, and wearjewelry.'" Id. (citation omitted). One of plain-
tiff's expert witnesses, a social psychologist and Associate Professor of Psychology, testi-
fied that the partnership selection process was influenced by sex stereotyping based on
both the "overtly sex-based comments of partners" and "gender-neutral remarks, made
by partners who knew Hopkins only slightly, that were intensely critical of her." Id.
One of the central tenets of social cognition theory is that these biases operate
absent intent or self-awareness. See Krieger, supra note 32, at 1188 ("[P]erhaps most
significantfor present purposes, they bias a decision maker's judgment long before the
'moment of decision,' as a decision maker attends to relevant data and interprets, en-
codes, stores, and retrieves it from memory."). Thus, in many cases, a Title VII claim
brought against an employer becomes a particularly touchy subject because the em-
ployer may honestly believe that he did not discriminate. Claims of discrimination are
also resented by employers because of the terrible stigma associated with being "preju-
diced" or "biased."
Lawrence, supra note 75, at 343.
See Krieger, supra note 32, at 1190 ("In intergroup relations, these biases, medi-
ated through perception, inference, and judgment, can result in discrimination,
whether we intend it or not, whether we know it or not.").
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but acknowledging cognitive bias in group decision making could at
least provide the impetus for reformulating the present legal standard
of disparate treatment. Such a course of action, as this Comment ad-
vocates in Part V, seems particularly prudent, considering the recent
popularity of enhanced employee participation in many of the coun-
try's large corporations.
B. Issues Raised in Performing a Disparate Impact Analysis
The potential complications raised by applying a disparate impact
standard to the group decision-making context, particularly to subjec-
tive decisions, is also quite troublesome. "A selection procedure that
combines both subjective and objective criteria is generally considered
subjective in nature, and, therefore, is an appropriate subject for dis-
parate impact analysis."
8 7
1. Complications Raised by Claims of Disparate Impact
in a Team-Based Employment System
Problem 1:
First, the question of what constitutes the "qualified" labor market
is subject to many interpretations, particularly when such a determina-
tion is largely subjective by nature. In the group context, many of the
so-called qualifications for a supervisory position within the work team
hinge on factors that are difficult to validate empirically. Therefore,
few employer-enacted safeguards ensure that the ultimate decision
was not reached arbitrarily nor by using unlawful considerations, such
as race or gender. Professor Krieger has argued:
Herein lies the practical problem with applying disparate impact theory
to subjective practices cases: Validating subjective decision making sys-
tems in accordance with professionally acceptable standards is neither
empirically nor economically feasible, especially for jobs where intangi-
ble qualities, such as interpersonal skills, creativity, and the ability to
make sound judgments under conditions of uncertainty, are critical. Ac-
cordingly, if a court applies disparate impact theory in subjective prac-
tices cases, one of two undesirable outcomes will necessarily result: ei-
ther the validation requirement will be weakened or eliminated entirely,
as already appears to be occurring, or its imposition will place severe and
87 45AAM.JUR. 2D, supra note 38, § 418 (citing Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d
1417, 1424 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Selection systems that combine both subjective and objec-
tive criteria are generally considered subjective in nature.")); see also Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 989 (1988) ("[It is apparent that selection systems
that combine both types would generally have to be considered subjective in nature.").
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ultimately unworkable burdens on small and medium-sized employers.8
Problem 2:
The ability of a plaintiff to identify the specific discriminatory
practice also raises complicated issues because a plaintiff must identify
exactly what aspect of the team process caused the disparate impact8 9
The fact that team members may be biased against certain people may
inhibit, for example, a minority's opportunity for promotion. In such
a case, the plaintiff must identify what aspect of the promotion system
caused the discrimination. This requirement has several implications.
First, a worker is indirectly, and in some cases directly, accusing his or
her peers of being prejudiced, which will not only ostracize that plain-
tiff from the team, but also will hurt team performance. A team-based
organizational structure may be more severely impacted by employee
claims than a traditional one because an employee's accusation
against a supervisor within a traditional organization generally does
not undermine an employer's entire operation. Second, the tradi-
tional business setting may not require a plaintiff to work closely with
the accused supervisor, whereas the team model requires the efficient
interaction of every member of the team in an amiable working envi-
ronment.99 Finally, if an employer agrees that the team has been bi-
ased in whom it promotes and takes that power away from the team,
one of the most important aspects of the team concept-its auton-
omy-will be disrupted.
Problem 3:
Title VII, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, shifts the
burden of proof to the employer to demonstrate that "each identified
discriminatory practice or practices are consistent with business neces-
sity, including mixed subjective [and] objective procedures."9' When
an employer considers subjective qualities in promoting its employees,
88 Krieger, supra note 32, at 1232.
89 See supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing the particularity require-
ment in establishing a prima facie case of discrimination).
90 Transferring a plaintiff in the team context is not as acceptable a solution as it is
in the traditional, supervisor-subordinate case. No clear job descriptions exist in self-
directed work teams due to the overlapping roles within a team. In a more traditional
setting, by contrastjob roles are more clearly defined. Therefore, transferring a plain-
tiff to an equivalentjob in the team setting is inherently more difficult because no role
in two different teams will be identical. In addition, while a transferred employee in a
traditional, hierarchical organization must gain the respect of his new supervisor, a
transferred team member will have to earn the admiration of multiple new team
members.
91 45AAM.JUR. 21, supra note 38, § 418 (footnote omitted).
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for example, the employer must prove that the subjective quality is
necessary to ensure effective job performance.? "In order to defend a
disparate impact challenge to a subjective promotion system, an em-
ployer must present evidence that subjectivity is job-related, that is,
that something about the position requires the selector to use subjec-
tive evaluations of the applicant's unquantifiable attributes."0 The ra-
tionale behind such a policy is fairly obvious:
[S]ubjective criteria are closely scrutinized by the courts, because an
over-emphasis on subjective evaluations in employment decisions tends
to favor incumbent workers at the expense of minorities and offers a
ready mechanism for discrimination.... Elusive, purely subjective stan-
dards must give way to objectivity if statistical indicia of discrimination
are to be refuted.94
Nonetheless, assuming a plaintiff succeeds in establishing that a
particular practice has a disparate impact on a protected class, the ag-
grieved team member will still have an uphill battle to succeed in a Ti-
tie VII claim.95 The employer can easily justify the particular employ-
ment practice in question by diverting the blame to the subjective
determination of the team and arguing that it is necessary for the
team to have province over its own management. This defense is logi-
cal and fairly convincing if one considers that a team must respect its
supervisor in order to be efficient, and, presumably, the team will
choose whomever it believes is the most qualified for the position. An
employer that steps in and upsets a team's choice for leadership may
undermine the autonomy of the team's structure, which can nega-
tively impact employee morale, firm commitment, and overall team
productivity. This scenario differs from traditional middle manage-
ment decisions in which the input of subordinate employees is never
sought.
In addition, unless courts require employers to demonstrate the
business necessity of the team's control of the challenged action, a
team decision can create further ambiguity for a court performing a
disparate impact analysis. Putting that burden on employers, how-
ever, may effectively eliminate team-based decision making, which
would not prove socially beneficial. How can a plaintiff formulate an
See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (discussing the burden on an em-
ployer who relies on subjective criteria in defending a Title VII claim).
45AAM.JUR. 2d, supra note 38, § 418.
94 Id. § 415 (footnote omitted).
95 See supra note 57 (noting the difficulty of contesting an employer's establishment
of a legitimate business interest).
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alternative to the particular employment practice when it is the very
system of group decision making that is most likely at issue in his
grievance?6
2. Complications Raised in Performing a Disparate Impact Analysis of
Team-Based Decisions Resulting from Cognitive Bias
When one considers the potential for cognitive bias in group deci-
sion making, performing a disparate impact analysis becomes even
more complicated. For example, the "qualified" aspect of the labor
pool can easily be influenced by the cognitive biases of the team
members who may subconsciously rate a particular employee's ability
to "lead" lower due to the color of her skin or national origin.
Moreover, in most team decisions, abstract skills, such as interpersonal
skills or leadership abilities, are in fact determinative in the team's
mind. It would be exceedingly difficult to objectify those qualities in
terms of "fit" with the team to the satisfaction of a court attempting to
determine the basis for a team's decision.
IV. TITLE VII CLAIMS INVOLVING SmucruREs
ANALAGOUS TO WORK TEAMS
According to the Wall StreetJourna, the suit against S.C. Johnson
filed in district court in Milwaukee is the first claim challenging the
team regime under Title VII.9 8 Cases have been reported in which
plaintiffs contest an individual's employment decision made within
the team context.? It is unclear, with the prevalence of self-directed
96 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides that in the event the plaintiff can demon-
strate that "elements of a respondent's decision making process are not capable of
separation for analysis, the decision making process may be analyzed as one employ-
ment practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (B) (i) (1994).
97 See supra note 84 (discussing the impact cognitive bias can have on an individ-
ual's perception of another); see also Krieger, supra note 27, at 1294 ("[D]efining suc-
cess is a subjective process subject to subtle forms of intergroup bias with which exist-
ing civil rights law has little capacity to reckon."). It could be argued that
decentralized forms of decision making, like those that exist in self-directed work
teams, reduce the level of prejudice and bias in the decision-making process, especially
in a forum where the decision makers have a continuing relationship with one an-
other. Assuming that such a rationale has some merit, it still fails to account for the
cognitive biases among individual decision makers. Moreover, recent studies have
confirmed that African-American and Hispanic men still suffer from widespread dis-
crimination. See id. at 1803 (describing the results of three recent studies suggesting
such discrimination).
9s See supra note 27 (noting the novelty of the S.C.Johnson case).
99 See, e.g., Heam v. General Elec. Co., 927 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Ala. 1996). In
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work teams in the Fortune 1000, why there have not been more re-
ported claims of discrimination. One possible explanation is that
workers are happier in this decentralized form of industry and do not
want to "rock the boat."' 00 A second possibility, mentioned earlier, is
that the continuing relationships within work teams have helped
eliminate more overt forms of discrimination. T10 Finally, it is quite
plausible that potential plaintiffs have been thwarted in their attempts
to bring such claims by the lack of applicable precedent and by the
legal community's uncertainty about how to handle such a claim. De-
spite the apparent shortcoming in Title VII law in this regard, there
are reported cases that offer appropriate analogies and potential in-
sights into the focus of this paper.
Woodson v. Scott Paper Co. is an example of a case in which the
Third Circuit dealt with a multi-input employment decision under a
Title VII "pretext analysis."' 2 In Woodson, the company undertook a
"company-wide reorganization of its management team."10 3 Upper
management conducted evaluations of its twenty-seven managers in
order to terminate its bottom five. The only two African-American
managers were ranked in the bottom five and were subsequently laid
off.0 4 One of the terminated managers brought a Title VII suit, claim-
ing race discrimination and retaliatory discharge. Three senior level
employees performed the evaluations in question, "without interviews,
and two of the three evaluators had little familiarity with the plaintiff's
work."0 5 In addition, they had not reviewed the plaintiff's personnel
file when making their decisions. The evaluators relied on both sub-
jective and objective reasons for their decision, claiming that the
plaintiff's philosophy made him an ineffective team leader and refer-
Hearn, the plaintiff challenged a plant manager's establishment of work "teams" that
negatively impacted the few women previously employed in the plant. See id. at 1489-
90. The plaintiff offered direct and circumstantial evidence of the plant manager's
animus toward women in the workplace, and the court ultimately ruled in the plain-
tiff s favor. See id. at 1495-99, 1501 (holding that the establishment of the teams dis-
criminated against the plaintiff). For another case in which the plaintiff initially
claimed that the "team" created a hostile working environment for women but later
withdrew that claim and proceeded under other theories of liability, see Reed v. A.W.
Lawrence & Co., 95 Fd 1170 (2d Cir. 1996).
100 See supra note 13 and accompanying text (noting the positive effect enhanced
participation has on employee morale).
101 See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text (describing the group responsibili-
ties of self-directed work teams).
102 109 F.3d 913 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 914 (1997).
103 898 F. Supp. 298, 300 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
104 See id.
105 Id.
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ring to his department's poor performance since he became its
leader. 6 Discrepancies between job skill ratings and the new per-
formance ratings were supposed to be explained to the Corporate Re-
view Committee. The "discrepancy between [the plaintiff's] successful
prior record of achievement and his poor ranking," however, was
never raised to the Review Committee.107 The plaintiff was successful
in demonstrating that two of the three evaluators knew that he had
previously brought charges against the employer for discrimination in
its promotion practices when they assigned to plaintiff the numerical
grades that resulted in his termination.1 18  Plaintiff also established
that one of the evaluators considered the plaintiff a "borderline in-
subordinate" based on his complaint to the EEOC.09 The jury re-
turned a verdict for the plaintiff based on the theory that the "rating
system used to select him for termination was pretextual."" °
Woodson is helpful because it elucidates that when a group em-
ployment decision is challenged, courts are willing to inquire into how
the group-in this case, the three managers performing evaluations-
reached its decision. The lack of a more formalized evaluation struc-
ture and the possibility that two of the three evaluators may have been
biased against the plaintiff proved dispositive. Woodson, however, is a
bit unique in that there was "direct" evidence of potential animus to-
ward the plaintiff,"' which is not generally available in suits of this na-
ture.
The majority of cases challenging a group decision involve a
"mixed motive" theory, framing the issue as whether or not the plain-
tiff's "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating fac-
tor for any employment practice, even though other factors also moti-
vated the practice." 2 Cases involving claims of discrimination in the
108 See Woodson, 109 F.3d at 918 (citing an evaluator's affidavit describing the plain-
tiff as "borderline insubordinate in his rejection of the organization and cultural changes"
the company was trying to implement).
107 Id
108 See Woodson, 898 F. Supp. at 303 (finding that "two of the evauators... were
aware of the charges [by the plaintiff against the company] when they assigned plain-
tiff the numerical grades").
109 Id. at 304.
10 Id. at 300. The Third Circuit affirmed this part of the district court's opinion.
See Woodson, 109 F.3d at 924 ("[W]e conclude that the evidence presented at trial ... is
sufficient to support a causal link between Woodson's discrimination complaints and
his termination.").
I See Woodson, 898 F. Supp. at 304 (noting an evaluator's derisive comments about
the plaintiff after the plaintiff had filed his EEOC claim).
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994).
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academic setting are good illustrations of the application of the mixed
motive theory in the context of group decision making since employ-
ment decisions in academia are generally made by the consensus of
the faculty.
The plaintiff in Lam v. University of Hawaii, a woman of Vietnam-
ese decent, brought a claim against the university alleging discrimina-
tion on the basis of her race, sex, and national origin. "3 The selection
of faculty members at the University of Hawaii, as at most universities,
is based on a group decision by current faculty members. The ap-
pointments committee, which consists of three faculty members and
two students, has the initial task of screening applicants and selecting
final candidates for faculty positions. "[M]embers of the committee
independently selected the 15 to 20 candidates that they considered
most promising and the committee list was compiled based on these
separate lists."" 4 The entire fifteen-person faculty then debated and
voted on the finalists. "The hiring process is ... not insulated from
the illegitimate biases of faculty members. Indeed, since the faculty is
small-only fifteen members-and great emphasis is placed on colle-
giality and consensus decision making, even a single person's biases
may be relatively influential." 5 The plaintiff alleged that she was dis-
criminated against based on impermissible considerations under Title
VII. To validate her claim, Lam pointed to evidence that one member
of the appointments committee was biased against women and
Asians." 6 She also showed that another male faculty member stated
that the position should be filled by a male."
7
The Ninth Circuit moved away from the traditional "intent" analy-
sis and held that "a plaintiff in a university discrimination case need
not prove intentional discrimination at every stage of the decision-
making process; impermissible bias at any point may be sufficient to
sustain liability."" 8  The Ninth Circuit then reversed the District
1 No. 89-00378, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20572 (D. Haw. Aug. 13, 1991), rev'd in
par, 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994).
14 40 F.3d at 1558.
15 Id. at 1560. This supports the argument that one team member can have a seri-
ous impact on the ultimate decision. See infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text
(discussing the findings of industrial psychologists that group decision making is influ-
enced by the social status of the advocating participants).
16 See Lam, 40 F.3d at 1560 (describing Lam's evidence of discriminatory bias in
the hiring process).
17 See id. ("There was also evidence that another white male professor had stated
that given Japanese cultural prejudices, the PALS [Pacific Asian Legal Studies] director
should be male.").
18 Id. at 1560-61 (citing Roebuck v. Drexel Univ., 852 F.2d 715, 727 (3d Cir.
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Court's grant of the defendant's motion for summary judgment since
a material issue of fact existed regarding whether there was a dis-
criminatory motive for the employment decision.1
The Lam case is quite useful in enabling one to speculate whether
a court, in finding that one member of a team has a prejudice against
another team member or potential team member, would consider
that finding sufficient to attach liability to the employer. Thus, if Lam
is any indication, a court analyzing a Title VII claim based on a team
decision would only require a plaintiff to show that one member of
her team was prejudiced against her demographic group in order to
establish liability. Such a result seems warranted in light of the ability
of one prejudiced team member to exert powerful influence over the
group's ultimate decision if she is held in high regard by a majority of
the team. The Lam case, however, is not so helpful when no direct
evidence of animus toward a protected group can be gathered, as is
more frequently the case. To deal with those situations, courts have
allowed the application of disparate impact analysis to subjective em-
ployment criteria. Courts have permitted claims of disparate impact
that challenge subjective employment decisions to prevent employers
from insulating themselves from Title VII liability by relying on the
subjective evaluations of supervisors and middle management. The
Supreme Court has noted:
[Ilt may be customary and quite reasonable simply to delegate employ-
ment decisions to those employees who are most familiar with the jobs to
be filled and with the candidates for those jobs. It does not follow, how-
ever, that the particular supervisors to whom this discretion is delegated
always act without discriminatory intent. Furthermore, even if one as-
sumed that any such discrimination can be adequately policed through
1988)); see also Fields v. Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931, 933-35 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that
a female professor, who proved by direct evidence that unlawful discrimination moti-
vated the University in denying her tenure, was not required to also prove that the dis-
crimination was a "but for" cause). The Lam court further commented on the diffi-
culty of establishing a claim of discrimination in the group context: "The university
setting-in which, as in this case, employment decisions are made by a group, and col-
legiality and personal relationships are often significant factors-presents an especially
difficult one in which to evaluate allegations of discrimination. As with all group deci-
sion making, a complex of motives may exist." Lam, 40 F.3d at 1564. The court's
statement about faculty appointments is equally applicable to team-based decisions,
which operate in similar ways.
19 See ii. at 1554-55 (reversing the award of partial summary judgment and re-
manding for trial the plaintiff's claim of discrimination with regard to the 1987-1988
hiring search).
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disparate treatment analysis, the problem of subconscious stereotypes
and prejudices would remain.1
2 0
The Supreme Court sought to control the dissipation of Title VII
claims under a disparate impact theory and to avoid forcing employ-
ers to validate the use of subjectivity in their evaluations by stressing
the burdens of establishing a prima facie case. 12' The Court went on
to state:
It is self-evident that many jobs, for example those involving managerial
responsibilities, require personal qualities that have never been consid-
ered amenable to standardized testing. In evaluating claims that discre-
tionary employment practices are insufficiently related to legitimate
business purposes, it must be borne in mind that "[c]ourts are generally
less competent than employers to restructure business practicesand un-
less mandated to do so by Congress they should not attempt it."
Thus, while the Supreme Court gave plaintiffs who felt victimized
by a subjective decision-making process an avenue for redress under
Title VII, the Court left them to fight an uphill battle by giving much
deference to employers' personnel decisions.
Subjective employment decisions, particularly in the group con-
text, clearly raise some interesting problems in terms of regulation
and proof under present Title VII law. The increased prevalence of
team-based decision making in American companies will only exacer-
bate Tide VII's present shortcomings in this regard. Neither present
disparate treatment nor disparate impact jurisprudence provides am-
ple opportunity for employees ostracized from the team system to
have an adequate remedy.12t However, a reformulation of present Ti-
tle VII law to account for this shift in the structure of American busi-
120 Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988). This statement
acknowledges the Court's awareness of cognitive biases that can unconsciously influ-
ence a decision maker in reaching her ultimate decision. Lower courts have followed
the Supreme Court's lead in acknowledging the potential for cognitive biases to infect
an employment decision. See, e.g., Allen v. Seidman, 881 F.2d 375, 381 (7th Cir. 1989)
("[T]he danger [of administering tests devoid of objective standards] is acute that ra-
cia bias of which the testers may well be unconscious will influence the grade."); Sten-
der v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 259, 335 (N.D. Cal. 1992) ("[T]he court finds
that Lucky's policy of leaving initial placement, promotion and training decisions to
the sole discretion of lower level supervisors whose conscious and subconscious preju-
dices are unchecked by objective and publicized decision making criteria, has had a
disparate impact....").
121 SeeWatson, 487 U.S. at 993-94.
12 Id. at 999 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978)).
12 See supra text accompanying note 28 (noting that Title VII law does not require
a "grievance procedure for team members who feel that they have been treated un-
fairly").
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ness operations, as Part V advocates, could effectively solve this def-
ciency in Title VII jurisprudence without opening the floodgates to
frivolous claims.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE TITLE VII ANALYSiS ACCOUNTING FOR THE
NEW PRODUCTION MODEL
The present Title VII framework does not adequately protect em-
ployees working under the new model of production, particularly, self-
directed work teams. Title VII was formulated on the premise that an
individual decision maker may not take an employee's race, national
origin, or sex into account at the moment an employment decision is
made.12 As alluded to earlier, this presumption is deficient in three
ways. First, Title VII analysis, under both disparate treatment and dis-
parate impact theories, fails to account for many companies' use of
enhanced employee participation in their workplaces, which has ex-
panded the number of inputs into an employment decision. Second,
the notion that an employer will state in some tangible way its animus
toward a particular group is unlikely in today's more politically correct
business society, making it more difficult for an employee to prove
that she was discriminated against under the theory of disparate
treatment. Finally, neither the disparate treatment nor disparate im-
pact theories acknowledge the notion that an employer may not be
conscious of a bias that has infected its decision-making process. 2
Courts and legislators should take several steps to ameliorate the
present shortcomings in Title VII law. Such steps would include:
(i) requiring employers to articulate legitimate reasons for challenged
employment decisions and to establish procedural safeguards to check
for evaluator bias; (ii) imposing some form of liability on employers
based on a showing that one decision maker among many took unlaw-
ful considerations into account; and (iii) permitting plaintiffs to point
to the team system in general when making claims of disparate im-
pact.
124 See supra Part 11 (discussing the courts' traditional analysis of Title VII).
1 See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text (discussing the disparate impact
theory as an alternative to the disparate treatment theory).
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A. Elimination of the "Hicks Factor"
First, the Hicks factor1 26 should be reversed for all Title VII cases.
Hicks established that in the event a trier of fact finds that the em-
ployer's proffered rationale for the employment decision was pretex-
tual, it may nonetheless deduce its own rationale for the decision in
question, thus allowing the employer to escape liability.12 Based on
the acceptance of cognitive bias theory by the Supreme Court,128 it is
no longer reasonable to require a plaintiff to rebut the employer's of-
fered rationales for its employment decision as well as any other rea-
son that a trier of fact might adduce. If a trier of fact decides that the
employer is being untruthful about its rationale for a particular em-
ployment decision after a plaintiff has satisfied his prima facie burden
and shifted the burden of production to the employer, liability should
attach. If an employer cannot articulate a credible reason, either ob-
jective or subjective, for the employment decision in question, it may
well be the result of a decision infected by cognitive bias. Courts
should recognize this as a violation of Tide VII. It is not too onerous a
burden to require that employers legitimize their decisions by offering
lawful and legitimate reasons for their decisions, particularly when a
plaintiff has satisfied her prima facie requirement. The inability to
provide legitimate reasons raises a strong inference of discrimination,
either blatant or cognitive, and should be unlawful under Tide VII ju-
risprudence. This change-requiring the employer to offer lawful
and legitimate reasons for its decision-will also diminish the impact
of a judge or jury's cognitive bias since they will not be able to find a
legitimate reason not proffered by the employer. Eliminating the
Hicks factor will help ameliorate Title VII's failure to acknowledge
cognitive bias without allowing a floodgate of frivolous litigation.
B. The Establishment of Procedural Safeguards
A federal statute also should require that employers utilizing
forms of group decision making establish procedural safeguards to
126 See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (discussing the Hicks factor-that
for an employer to be found guilty of discrimination, the trier of fact must affirmatively
find that the employer's action was the product of unlawful discrimination).
127 See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the Hicks de-
cision); see also Schallop v. New York Dep't of Law, 20 F. Supp. 2d 384, 401 (N.D.N.Y.
1998) ("The existence of factual questions whether defendants' stated reason was pre-
textual does not end the inquiry into pretext, however.").
128 See supra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's recognition of
cognitive bias in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988)).
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prevent and catch an evaluator's bias toward a particular individual,
particularly when the decisions involve a level of subjectivity.'29 As dis-
cussed earlier, in both Woodson1 31 and Lai,'5 ' the employer failed to
take such measures or to subject the employment decision in question
to the measures that were established for that purpose.'32 Procedural
safeguards should involve several different processes in order to
achieve their ultimate goal. One treatise has suggested:
Employers that must use subjective criteria as job requirements for posi-
tions that are not susceptible to objective description should construct
their selection process carefully, keeping certain safeguards in mind. In
implementing a selection process, any personal traits required should be
expressed in writing as concretely as possible.... Furthermore, supervi-
sors should be given specific written instructions on the application of
any subjective elements used in evaluating personnel. The opinion of
more than one supervisor should be solicited to minimize the chance of
individual bias, and supervisory evaluations should be reviewed by higher
management and by personnel or human resources staff. Finally, em-
ployees should be offered an opportunity to respond to supervisory
evaluations, and an appelp rocedure should be established for employ-
ees to contest evaluations.
1. Express Personal Traits in Writing and Give Instructions on How to
Apply Subjective Elements Used in Evaluating Personnel
While many decisions reached by a self-directed work team are
necessarily subjective, the employer should provide each individual
team member with specific guidelines for assessing other team mem-
bers.' 4 In order to make the evaluations more objective, employers
should also list certain attributes that are essential for effective per-
formance of a particularjob because:
12 See Krieger supra note 27, at 1285 ("[O]nly the application of deliberate, con-
trolled, corrective processes can prevent stereotypes and subtle in group priming va-
lences from biasing interpersonaljudgment.").
IS 109 F.3d 913 (3d Cir. 1997).
1 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994).
132 See Woodson, 109 F.3d at 918 (discussing the employer's failure to adhere to
company downsizing policies in terminating the plaintiff); La=, 40 F.3d at 1558 (not-
ing that "guidance for the selection process was minimal").
45A AM. JR. 2D, supra note 38, § 419.
13 See Krieger, supra note 27, at 1286 (explaining that, in order to control the ef-
fects of unconscious bias, one must be aware of the process that can threaten one's
judgment, motivated to correct its unwanted influence, able to discern the direction
and magnitude of the bias, and have sufficient control over one's mental processes to
correct the effect of unwanted influences).
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[E]xperimental evidence suggests that we can reduce stereotypic biases
in evaluation when evaluative criteria are specifically identified and when
we provide decision makers with a rich body of specific diagnostic in-
formation on which to base decisions. Stereotypic expectancies and
other subtle forms of bias will have less influence in the evaluation proc-
ess when decision makers apply less generalized, and more specific,
preferably objective, criteria.
Under such a system, the evaluator would merely be required to
give a specific numerical ranking on each attribute being considered.
Employers should also provide evaluators with ample space to explain
additional considerations which they believed were important in
reaching their decision. Important attributes such as innate leader-
ship qualities might not be specifically evaluated, but nonetheless
might be worth mentioning to an employer. The key to an effective
evaluation process is for an employer to explain both the dangers of
cognitive bias and the aspects of the employer's system designed to
minimize such behavior.
2. A Review Process to Check for Outliers
Employers should check for outliers in any particular employee's
evaluation reports. Outliers are evaluations that are completely in-
consistent with the team's general consensus about a particular em-
ployee's abilities. In such a case, the outlier raises an inference that
the evaluator may have considered factors, other than those enumer-
ated, in evaluating the employee in question. Each evaluator's opin-
ion of a team member should be compared with other evaluations of
that team member to uncover any significant discrepancies. In the
event that outliers exist, the employer should exclude them in making
its ultimate decision. If one team member's evaluation of a fellow
team member appears to be so out of line with the rest of the group, it
is likely the product of some form of bias.
3. An Appeal Process
All employees who are dissatisfied with a particular employment
decision should have the right to appeal that decision. Many team
structures already have some form of grievance procedure in place to
maximize employee satisfaction.'s' An appeal process will reduce the
135 Krieger, supra note 27, at 1329-30.
136 See supra note 28 (discussing certain teams' establishment of peer disciplinary
committees).
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ultimate influence of cognitive bias by subjecting unfavorable em-
ployment decisions to further scrutiny.3' Challenged employment
decisions that strike the reviewing committee as undeserved or erro-
neous should be overturned.
4. Consequences of Failing to Establish Safeguards
While establishing such safeguards may seem tedious and disrup-
tive to the informality of the team process, such protections are neces-
sary to control bias in major employment decisions.us An employer
that fails to employ such safeguards in a necessarily subjective em-
ployment decision should have the burden of proving that the em-
ployment decision in question was not tainted with unlawful consid-
erations.
Thus, a plaintiff's claim of discrimination under Title VII should
take into account whether the employer has established and utilized
specific safeguards to catch and control incidents of discrimination by
individual team members at the first stage in establishing a prima facie
case. If the plaintiff satisfies the prima facie requirements and also
demonstrates that the employer does not utilize the aforementioned
safeguards, the burden of proof, not the burden of production as the
law presently states," should shift to the employer to demonstrate
that unlawful considerations were not part of this employment deci-
sion. However, if an employer has the necessary safeguards in place,
and the plaintiff satisfies the prima facie test, only the burden of pro-
duction should shift to the employer to articulate a non-
137 See supra text accompanying note 62 (noting employers' use of an appeal proc-
ess when utilizing subjective criteria in their personnel evaluations).
138 Given the many minor decisions that are reached every day in the team model,
it would be unduly burdensome to require that an employer subject every decision
reached by the group to such a process. For important decisions, however, such as hir-
ing, discipline, layoffs, evaluations, and promotions, such safeguards can be relatively
easily implemented and utilized by employers to control unlawful bias on the part of
individual team members. Many employers utilizing the team approach already em-
ploy some of these "safeguards." For example, in performing peer appraisals in teams,
some employers have "each team member... evaluated by two team members, one of
his or her choosing and one chosen by the rest of the team." YEATrs & HYTEN, supra
note 14, at 129. Employers utilizing self-directed work teams also have set up employee
grievance committees to process allegations of improper or unfair team decisions. See
supra text accompanying note 28 (discussing the suggestion by proponents of the team
model to create some form of grievance procedure for team members who feel they
have been treated unfairly).
19 See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (explaining that, under current
law, after a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts
to the employer to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for the decision).
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discriminatory reason for the employment decision in question. In
such a case, the burden of proof remains with the plaintiff. In light of
the significant evidentiary difference between proving that discrimina-
tion did not occur in a given situation and merely proffering a non-
140discriminatory reason for a decision, this reformulated legal analysis
will provide liability-averse employers with significant incentives to es-
141tablish mechanisms to control bias.
C. ImputingPartial Liability to an Employer When One Member
of the Team Takes Unlawful Considerations into Account
in Reaching an Employment Decision
If a plaintiff can demonstrate that a particular team member dis-
criminated against her, that too should be significant in attaching
some form of liability to the employer under Title VII. Olson v. General
Electric Astrospace stands for the proposition that if a supervisor takes
unlawful considerations into account in reaching a particular em-
ployment decision, that decision can be imputed to the employer
1 4
This presumably stems from the fact that employers value the opin-
ions of their supervisors, particularly ones who have firsthand knowl-
edge of the requirements of a particular job or the attributes of a par-
ticular individual.14 That emphasis on particular, firsthand
140 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (discussing the difference between
the burden of proof and the burden of production).
141 The Supreme Court has previously provided employers with incentives to adopt
certain employment practices in sexual harassment cases by providing employers with
an affirmative defense in certain situations. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524
U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (holding that "[w] hen no tangible employment action is taken, a
defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to
proof by a preponderance of the evidence" (citation omitted)). To raise an affirmative
defense to a claim of sexual harassment, the employer must demonstrate that he "ex-
ercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behav-
ior." Id& He must also show that the plaintiff "unreasonably failed to take advantage of
any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer." Id. While not
dispositive of the first prong of the defense, an employer's implementation of an "anti-
harassment policy with complaint procedure... may appropriately be addressed in
any case when litigating the first element of the defense." Id. In addition, an em-
ployer's demonstration that the plaintiff failed to utilize a complaint procedure pro-
vided by the employer "will normally suffice to satisfy the employer's burden under the
second" prong. Id.
142 See Olson v. General Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 955 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting
that "[w]here a hiring decision is based largely or entirely on a recommendation or
evaluation made by an employee who perceived the applicant as disabled, the em-
ployer can be held liable in a perception case"); see also supra note 72 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the Olson case).
143 See id. at 954-55 (noting that the supervisor in question had previously worked
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knowledge holds true in the team context and may even be more
dramatic due to the close professional and personal relationships that
often are formed within the team structure.'4 Industrial psychologists
have documented that group decision making is influenced by the so-
cial status of the members advocating a particular position.'4 Thus, if
a particular team member enjoys an elevated status within the group,
that team member's opinion can be quite influential in the ultimate
group decision. Therefore, the potential influence of a single
member on a particular decision can be as great as if it had come
from a direct supervisor.
Accordingly, if it is proven that a team member allowed unlawful
considerations to bias his decision, liability should be imputed to the
employer. Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a team member has
taken unlawful considerations into account in forming her decision,
the employer can raise a partial affirmative defense by demonstrating
that she would have reached the same decision regardless of the un-
lawful consideration, according to the law presently set forth in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991.147 Thus, in such a scenario, the court should
still be authorized to grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and at-
torney's fees and costs incurred as a result of the litigation. This pro-
posal does not advocate for a dramatic change in the law; it merely
clarifies the idea that when a plaintiff demonstrates that one of her
team members took unlawful considerations into account in reaching
her decision, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to show that
the same decision Would have been reached despite the unlawful con-
siderations. The input of one discriminatory team member therefore
should be enough to establish that discrimination was a motivating
with the plaintiff and was aware of his mental condition).
14 See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text (discussing the Ninth Circuit's
acknowledgement of the impact that a biased decision maker can have in an intimate
group decision-making context).
See, e.g., Charlan Jeanne Nemeth, Minority Dissent as a Stimulant to Group Perform-
ance, in GRouP, PRocESS AND PRODUCTIvrIY95, 97 (Stephen Worchel et al. eds., 1992)
(discussing the power of the majority in group decision making even when the major-
ity is wrong);_YEATrs & HYrEN, supra note 14, at 92-95 (discussing the phenomenon of
grou6pthink" and how decision making is affected by group dynamics).
See Barenberg, supra note 6, at 907 (noting the problems that result when "team
members flee responsibility by becoming dependent on a charismatic or domineering
team member or leader").
147 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2) (B)-(i) (1994) (giving the court authority to grant de-
claratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees and costs if a plaintiff can demon-
strate that unlawful considerations played a part in the employer's decision but the
employer is able to show that he "would have taken the same action in the absence of
the impermissible motivating factor").
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factor in the decision being challenged. The availability of relief is
necessary because it is too speculative to say whether a particular out-
come would have occurred without the influence of particular advo-
cates. That only one team member held discriminatory animus to-
ward another individual does not mean that other team members
were not influenced in some capacity by the discriminating individual.
D. Lenient Application of the "Aggregation Concept"
in Claims of Disparate Impact
Finally, courts should be lenient with plaintiffs who attempt to
demonstrate a prima facie case of disparate impact involving subjec-
tive, team-based decisions. The initial burden is on the plaintiff to
"demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice
causes a disparate impact."4" However, the Civil Rights Act of 1991
modified the analysis somewhat by stating that "if the complaining
party can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a respon-
dent's decision-making process are not capable of separation for
analysis, the decision-making process may be analyzed as one em-
ployment practice."14 9 Courts have struggled with how to apply this
provision of the Act, with some applying the aggregation concept
loosely and others taking a much more stringent approach.15' Despite
the present lack of uniformity in its application, courts should apply
the Act's aggregation concept loosely in the team context, particularly
when dealing with challenges to subjective decisions. Otherwise, it is
exceedingly difficult for plaintiffs to effectively challenge the applica-
14 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (B) (i) (1994); see also supra notes 49-58 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the plaintiff's burden in claims of disparate impact).
I 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (B) (i).
150 Compare, e.g., Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., Nos. C-94-4335SI, C-95-2182 SI, 1997
WL 605754, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 1997) (stating that the defendant's system of
delegating hiring, pay, job assignment, and promotion decisions to store managers is
incapable of separation for analysis), and Association of Mexican-Am. Educators v.
California, 937 F. Supp. 1397, 1408 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (treating three subparts of an ex-
amination as a single practice), amended and superseded by 1999 WL 976720 (9th Cir.
1999), and Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 259, 335 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (find-
ing that the defendant's "subjective and ambiguous decision making processes are not
separable for the purposes of analysis, and therefore may be analyzed as one employ-
ment practice"), withJohnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 965 F.2d 1363, 1367 (5th Cir. 1992)
(finding that plaintiffs failed to satisfy their prima facie burden because they did not
perform a "systematic analysis of the racial effects of all promotional criteria for each
rank" (citation omitted)), and Appleton v. Deloitte & Touche L.L.P., 168 F.R.D. 221,
225-26 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (denying class certification to plaintiffs challenging an em-
ployer's use of subjectivity in making employment decisions for failing to demonstrate
a breakdown of each personnel decision).
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tion of team-based decision making because it is unlikely that a plain-
tiff can demonstrate a significant statistical disparity if she is only chal-
lenging a micro-aspect of the team process due to the lack of similarly
situated team members.
For example, in Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., "female employees and
applicants throughout Home Depot's West Coast Division, allege [d]
gender discrimination by Home Depot in hiring, initial assignments,
promotions, compensation and training."151 Home Depot moved for
summary judgment, claiming that plaintiffs' disparate impact claims
must fail because they have failed to identify specific employment
practices causing the alleged disparate impact.'12 Plaintiffs' sociologi-
cal expert, Dr. Bielby, summarized Home Depot's personnel system as
follows:
[I] t is the policy of Home Depot to delegate decisions about hiring, pay,
job assignment, and promotions to Store Managers or teams of manag-
ers who, individually and as a team, base those decisions on their own
subjective judgments with virtually no written criteria for systematically
evaluating the qualifications of individual candidates.
53
The court was satisfied, based on the aforementioned evidence, that
Home Depot's personnel decision-making process was incapable of
separation for analysis and could be challenged as one employment
practice.1 5 The facts of Home Depot and its rationale provide a close
analogy for a disparate impact claim brought by a disgruntled team
member or group of team members.
In order for a protected employee to have any hope of prevailing
on a valid claim of disparate impact, she will have to attack the entire
concept of autonomous work teams. Teams are too small to make a
more individualized claim with any statistical support. For example,
an African-American male team member will not be able to support
his claim that the team assignment system-assigning members' tasks
within the production process-is discriminatory if there are only a
few African-American men on the team, all of whom have been as-
signed different roles. A disgruntled team member should be permit-
1 Nos. C-94-4335 SI, C-95-2182 SI, 1997 WL 605754, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29,
1997).
152 See i& at *13 (noting Home Depot's argument that the four employment prac-
tices are capable of separation and therefore "plaintiffs must identify discrete employ-
ment practices by Home Depot that adversely impact female employees").
in I& at*13.
1 See id. ("Having reviewed the evidence in this matter, the Court is satisfied that
the elements of Home Depot's decisionmaking process are not capable of separation'
for analysis.").
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ted to rely on statistics from other teams within the company to dem-
onstrate the discriminatory impact of the employment practice.
When analyzing the team structure from the perspective of the com-
pany as a whole, plaintiffs will have a greater chance of demonstrating
a significant disparity between their protected class and the rest of the
demographic groups within the team system.
In drafting the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress stated: "When a
decision making process includes particular, functionally-integrated
practices which are components of the same criterion, standard,
method of administration, or test,... the particular, functionally-
integrated practices may be analyzed as one employment practice." 5
A particular employee's opportunities for advancement, job stability,
and work assignments are all determined by his autonomous work
team. Thus, the employment practice of placing a great deal of
autonomy in a team's control is a "functionally-integrated" practice,
and courts should apply the Act's aggregation concept leniently. The
African-American employees from S.C. Johnson, for example, should
be able to establish their prima facie claim of disparate impact by
showing that the employer's reliance on team work has hindered op-
portunities for all African Americans in the manufacturing plant, pro-
vided that the plaintiffs can statistically support their claim. At this
point, the burden of proof would shift to S.C. Johnson to show that
the team-based structure is a business necessity. Under this scenario,
the employer would still have the chance to prove that the autonomy
of teams significantly improves its productive capabilities, a notion
well supported by industrial psychologists. The plaintiffs, however, are
at least afforded an opportunity to proffer a readily available, non-
discriminatory alternative to the challenged practice. If courts apply
the Act's aggregation concept strictly, plaintiffs will rarely have the
opportunity to offer an effective alternative to the aspect of the team
system that is causing the challenged impact.
CONCLUSION
"The most comprehensive cross-national industrial study ever un-
dertaken (MIT's worldwide auto study) predicts confidently that the
Japanese model of team production is applicable to every industry in
all countries and is destined to 'become the standard global produc-
tion system of the twenty-first century." 156 The growing movement
155 137 CONG. REc. S 15273-01 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991).
156 Barenberg, supra note 6, at 927 (quoting JAMES P. WOMACK ET AL, THE
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within American companies to expand employee participation
through the use of work teams raises interesting challenges to the
structure of Title VII analysis. Moreover, the increased reliance on
subjective employment decisions continues to provoke interesting
questions and concerns. The Supreme Court's acknowledgment of
the potential for cognitive biases against protected groups only fur-
ther complicates the way in which an aggrieved employee must go
about proving Title VII claims under either the disparate treatment or
disparate impact theories.
Yet, there are ways to reform the present system to better elimi-
nate the various forms of prejudicial animus which Title VII was en-
acted to prevent. Eliminating the Hicks factor in Title VII jurispru-
dence, establishing procedural safeguards to minimize evaluator bias,
providing employers with only a partial affirmative defense when a
plaintiff demonstrates that one of his team members considered that
employee's race, national origin, or sex in reaching their decision,
and applying the Civil Rights Act of 1991's aggregation concept
loosely in claims of disparate impact will make Title VII more func-
tional, in light of the recent team trend in American companies.
Some of these reforms, such as the elimination of the Hicks factor,
are long overdue. Others, like requiring procedural safeguards, are
more controversial and have the potential of significantly altering
employers' litigation strategies. All of these suggested reforms, how-
ever, are necessary in light of the level of insulation that employers
presently enjoy under Title VII given the increased prevalence of sub-
jective, group decision making. These reforms are certainly not the
only ways in which to address and potentially resolve the shortcomings
of Title VII law, but they do offer an effective starting point.
MAcHmnJ THAT GHANGED THE WORLD 8, 256, 278 (1990)).
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